The Straits Times issued a challenge to its readers in May, calling on them to submit ideas on how to manage Sino-US ties amid the global tensions posed by the rise of China. Over 90 essays were submitted in response to the question : "Can the US and China escape the Thucydides Trap". We reproduce below the three shortlisted essays, starting with the winning entry:

By Goh Kyi Yeung

Issue: What will a grand strategy that effectively manages the opportunities and challenges presented by China look like?

Dynamics of Challenge: China's present developmental vision poses a growing threat to the interests of the United States.

First, China has flouted international norms without significant repercussions. It selectively follows international law and sponsors market distortions that jeopardises the economic well-being of the US and its allies.

Further, China may have revisionist intentions. It has aided America's strategic competitors, created alternative Chinese-led institutions and is heavily investing in offensive military capabilities that imperil US security interests.

Unfortunately, the US will struggle to maintain global leadership if the lack of domestic political consensus on China persists. Unlike the US, China's relatively stable political system leaves it well-placed to reap the rewards of investing in long-term policy goals, including technology and international political influence.

Threats to US national interests:

• Political and military threat: China interferes in domestic affairs and has developed military technology capable of undermining national security.
• US alliances: China's economic largesse and US inability to develop alternatives has allowed China to exert political pressure on other countries.
• US leadership: China is developing alternative institutions while growing its overseas military presence.
• Energy security: China has established overseas military presence along key supply routes.
• Economic security: China distorts markets through problematic economic practices.

Strategies:

1. COLD WAR II: CHINA AS HOSTILE THREAT

The focus is on countering perceived Chinese threats while developing capabilities for future conflict. The US must create exclusionary alliances while meeting the global demand for reduced reliance on China, limit cooperation to unambiguous mutual threats and develop its hard power advantage. China has incentive to reconsider actions that can be construed as revisionist.

However, there will be pushback given the high costs and uncertain returns of this strategy. It also forgoes potential gains from deeper cooperation and breeds mistrust while undermining dovish political forces in China.

2. PREPARING FOR MULTIPOLARISM: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK

Establishing a smooth transition to a multipolar order is key. The US should support and participate in Chinese-led initiatives, actively address China's legitimate grievances while adapting its diplomatic strategy to appeal to Chinese desire for discretion. This strategy provides room for increased cooperation with China, helps provide clues on Chinese intentions and smooths any transition by giving China leadership experience.

Unfortunately, the costs of misreading China's intentions as peaceful are high. It may also embolden China while leaving the US unwilling to intervene in thorny issues.

3. ENGAGE BUT HEDGE: INCREMENTAL, TRUST-BASED NEGOTIATION

The US will not concede its pre-eminent position, and the risk of conflict can be managed through institutional constraints. Trust is built through multilateral agreements with clear sanctioning mechanisms that deepen interdependence incrementally.

Investments should also be made into providing alternatives for countries should China choose to disengage. Over time, this strategy raises the lowest common denominator of cooperation, provides a means to understand China's intentions and reassure allies.

However, this option is time and cost-intensive with uncertain returns. Success also requires consistent policy and the agreement of a multitude of stakeholders.

Recommendation: The "engage but hedge" strategy is recommended as it assures allies while leaving room for sustainable yet conditional cooperation with China.

Implementation:

The US should:

• Engage with Congress to forge a lasting bipartisan support while signalling political will to allies;
• Begin exploring areas that benefit from institutionalisation; and
• Encourage further long-term bilateral economic investments.

Good indicators include China's willingness to commit to increasing costs for non-compliance and willingness of US allies to make tough decisions that will potentially strain relations with China.

Goh Kyi Yeong is a recent graduate of Columbia University and the London School of Economics. He has previously worked at the United Nations, the National Committee on US-China Relations and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

By Walter Woon

Challenge: Coping with the resumption by China of its historical global place.

Analysis: China is a returning power, not a rising one. The memory of historical oppression drives China to ensure that it is never again bullied by others. The adversary is the People's Republic of China (PRC), not the Chinese. Chinese people outside PRC are not responsible for PRC's sins. Speaking of "Chinese misdeeds" alienates these potential allies.

The PRC fears that America wants to reverse the result of the Civil War. Confrontation breeds perpetual enmity.

Forcing the PRC into a subordinate position creates a new sense of historical injustice. Culturally, Chinese people value prosperity over power for its own sake: "to get rich is glorious". World revolution is not the PRC's objective.

Braking the PRC's economic progress may work in the short term, but in the long term 1.5 billion commercially-minded people cannot be stopped from becoming a major economic force. A prosperous PRC will be good for the world.

National Interest: America's national interest is best served by a PRC intent on creating wealth rather than one that is resentful of attempts to frustrate its push to prosperity. The PRC's prosperity does not come at America's expense. Both have areas of comparative economic advantage. A rich PRC will buy more from America if allowed.

Bullying the PRC to preserve ephemeral economic advantages creates resentment. Strategic containment provokes hostility. A resentful and hostile PRC can create trouble, requiring commitment of resources better utilised to improve the lives of Americans.

Options:

Containment: Ensuring that the PRC never becomes powerful enough to challenge American predominance.

Pros: easy to understand.

Cons: unworkable in the long term. Inept American diplomacy has pushed together what Nixon-Kissinger pulled asunder, viz, China-Russia alignment. Selfish "America First" policies alienate friends and neutrals. Containment may slow the PRC's progress but cannot stop it, breeding enmity and consuming resources that could be used more productively elsewhere.

Transformation: Change the PRC to become more like America, hoping that it will then play by the rules.

Pros: fits American idealism.

Cons: generational project, requires patience, not guaranteed to work.

The current state of America is not a convincing advertisement for re-ordering Chinese society. It is a delusion to think that America is an attractive model. Harmony and responsibility are the basis of Chinese society, not personal rights and contestation.

The PRC is effectively capitalist. It wants to become rich, not promote world revolution. The PRC does not want to change America's political system; America should not try to change the PRC's. Doing so reinforces nationalistic pushback.

Outflanking: In September 2001 in Berlin, 100,000-plus people gathered in solidarity with America after the 9/11 attacks, remembering the "raisin-bombers" of the airlift that eased the Soviet blockade of the German city in 1948/1949. Generosity made America great. The PRC is its own worst enemy. "Middle-Kingdom" arrogance provokes resentment. American generosity will bring other countries onside.

America cannot stop the PRC's misdeeds alone; friends are vital for this purpose. "Face" makes the PRC sensitive to its image in non-Western countries. Non-Western countries should be cultivated by altruistic generosity to stand up to the PRC, but only where necessary. Do not make them choose sides; one can be friends with both.

Pros: builds on America's greatness.

Cons: requires long-term humility.

Recommendation: Outflank the PRC by working with friends to rein in its bad behaviour.

Implementation:

• Accept that America is primus inter pares, not imperator; selfish bullying does not make America great.
• Cultivate friendship by treating other countries generously.
• Work with friends to handle PRC.

Professor Walter Woon is the chairman of the Society for International Law Singapore and former Ambassador to Germany.

By Lily Ong

It is not hard to see that the United States is anxiously trying to preserve the status quo and its pre-eminence, while China is eagerly striving to have its new status recognised.

However, before we fall for the convenient notion of a Thucydides Trap, we must know that the Chinese are no fools; they recognise themselves to be the main beneficiary of the US-led growth, and thus see very little benefit in dismantling the established order altogether.

US projection of its own image upon China has only fed its own fear of the latter further. Of course, there are justifications for the US to view China as a competitor; China has gained from strength to strength economically, militarily, technologically, and even diplomatically.

Nonetheless, it is counterproductive for the US to view its game with China as one of zero sum. The US should look at engaging China in cooperative competition to produce a win-win outcome in common areas of concerns such as climate change, terrorism, drone use, militarisation of space, artificial intelligence, and nuclear proliferation. In the past, even geopolitical adversaries like the United States and Russia have cooperated successfully in aerospace and the International Space Station programme.